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RECENT DECISIONS
at that time did include the proceeds of the separation agreement
in the gross tax estate.30 Since this distinction is invalid, these
earlier cases involving separation agreements must also rely on the
above distinction that the spouse's interest was not intended to be
diminished by taxes.
As to the procedure for paying the estate taxes apportioned
against the widow in the instant case,31 the Court provided that
the company which was to pay the annuity should deduct a per-
centage of the monthly annuity payment, as it becomes due, for
taxes. Since there was no separate trust established with which
to pay the annuity, the question arises as to who would meet this
liability if the company should become insolvent. Would the widow
have to pay the full amount of the liability although she didn't
receive the full amount of the payments?
The purpose of section 124 was to relieve the residuary estate
from the burden of paying the entire estate tax by spreading the tax
liability over all the property included in the gross tax estate.32
This purpose was frustrated by those cases which, following the
reasoning of Matter of Brokaw,3 3 exempted from apportionment
property included in the gross tax estate which was subject to
contract claims. The Court here seems to be taking a large step
forward in giving to the statute the construction it was originally
intended to have, i.e., if the property is includible in the gross tax
estate, it is automatically subject to its apportioned share of the
taxes.
M
FEDERAL JURISDICTION - LABOR LAW - FEDERAL COURTS Au-
THORIZED TO ENJOIN STRIKES IN VIOLATION OF COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING AGREEMENTS DESPITE SECTION 4 OF NORRIS-LAGUARDIA
ACT.- Appellant labor union set up picket lines in an attempt to
organize non-union office employees of appellees, six interstate motor
carriers. In separate actions by the latter to enjoin the union's
picketing as a violation of the no-strike clause of separate collective
bargaining agreements, the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth
Circuit, held that despite the prohibition of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act against the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes, the federal
courts under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
(Taft-Hartley Act) have jurisdiction to enjoin strikes which are in
30 In the Matter of the Estate of Porter, supra note 27.
31 Since the executor had already paid the tax, the widow was to pay her
apportioned share to the estate.
32 2 Butler, Nmv YoRK SURROGATE LAW AND PRAcriCm § 1847 (1941).
3 180 Misc. 491, 41 N.Y.S.2d 57 (Surr. Ct. 1943), aff'd, 293 N.Y. 555,
59 N.E.2d 243 (1944) (per curiamn).
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violation of collective bargaining agreements. Chauffeurs Local 795
v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, Iw., 282 F.2d 345 (10th Cir.
1960), cert. granted, 364 U.S. 931 (1961).
The case of Commonwealth v. Hunt ' marked a substantial shift
in the American judicial attitude away from the view that labor
union activities were criminal conspiracies. The early categorical
condemnation of such union activity gave way to a qualified con-
cession of legality.2  However, this limited inroad of labor was
more than offset by the emergence of the injunction as a potent
weapon against concerted activity by labor unions.3 The failure of
the Clayton Act 4 to reverse this trend 5 led in 1932 to the passage
by Congress of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 0 which embodied a
basically laissez faire approach to labor-management relationsJ The
act, for all practical purposes, withdrew the jurisdiction of the federal
courts to issue injunctions or restraining orders in labor disputes.8
But the great strides made by labor since 1932 and the establish-
ment of labor unions as primary factors in the economic life of the
nation caused Congress to realize the impracticability of its hands-
off attitude.9 This realization was reflected in the passage of
the Labor-Management Relations Act,10 which sought to inject the
influence of the federal government into the area of labor-manage-
ment relations." It was inevitable that the Norris-LaGuardia Act
and the Labor-Management Relations Act, embodying, as they did,
certain fundamentally divergent legislative policies, should come into
conflict with one another.' 2  It is one aspect of that conflict which
presents itself in the principal case.
Section 4(a) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing
out of any labor dispute to prohibit . . . any of the following acts:
a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of
employment... .3
1 45 Mass. (4,Met.) 111 (1842).
2 Id. at 134.
3 See Loeb, Accomnmodation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to Other
Federal Statutes, 11 LA. L. J. 473 (1960).4 Anti-Trust Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1958).
5 See Loeb, supra note 3.647 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§101-15 (1958).
7 See Loeb, supra note 3, at 475.
8 Norris-LaGuardia Act § 4, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958).
9 See Loeb, supra note 3, at 476.
10 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958).
11 See note, 72 HARV. L. REv. 354, 356 (1958).
12 See Dannett, Picketing in Breach of a No-Strike Clause, 11 LAB. L. J.
379 (1960).




Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any
district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, with-
out respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship
of the parties 4
The interpretation of these two sections and their relationship
to each other has led to the question of whether the jurisdictional
grant embodied in the quoted portion of the Taft-Hartley Act by
implication repealed or modified the categorical ban of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act against the issuance of injunctions by the federal
courts in labor disputes. In terms of the principal case, can the
federal courts, by virtue of the authority vested in them by section
301, enjoin labor strikes called in violation of collective bargaining
agreements, despite the provisions of Section 4 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act? 15 Put another way, is it possible to effect en-
forcement of a no-strike clause through an injunction?
Subsequent to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, the
question was raised a number of times, and the courts consistently
decided it in the negative.16  In W. L. Mead, Inc. v. Teamsters
Union,7 the employer sued for damages and injunctive relief against
the union's strike and continued picketing in violation of its collective
bargaining agreement.' 8 Chief Judge Magruder came to the con-
clusion that an employer's remedy in such a situation was limited
to an action for damages. 19 The court seemed willing to concede
that section 301 might justify the granting of equitable relief, but
not where such relief was expressly prohibited by congressional
legislation, as it was in this case, by Section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia. 20
The opinion went on to say that had Congress intended by section
301 a pro tanto repeal of section 4, it would have enacted an ex-
plicit provision to that effect, just as it did with regard to suits
brought by the Attorney General 21 and to actions initiated by the
14Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301 (a), 61 Stat.
156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958).
25 Chauffeurs Local 795 v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, 282 F.2d 345(10th Cir. 1960).
16 See, e.g., W. L. Mead, Inc. v. Teamsters Union, 217 F.2d 6 (1st Cir.
1954); Alcoa SS. Co. v. McMahon, 81 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
'1 217 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1954).
as Id. at 8.
29 Id. at 9.20 Ibid.
21 Labor-Management Relations Act § 208(b), 61 Stat. 155 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 178(b) (1958).
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National Labor Relations Board involving unfair labor practices. 22
Finally, if there were merit in the contention that preservation of
the bargaining process indicated the necessity of extending in-
junctive relief against strikes in violation of collective bargaining
agreements, it seemed to the court that such a policy consideration
ought properly to be addressed to Congress rather than the courts. 23
In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 24 the union sued to com-
pel arbitration according to the terms of its contract. Before taking
up the question of whether equitable relief was possible under the
terms of section 301, Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority,
considered the more fundamental problem of the section's constitu-
tionality which had been made the subject of serious doubt by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in Association of Westinghouse Salaried Em-
ployees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.2 5 Basically, the difficulty was
this-if section 301 is purely jurisdictional, then its constitutionality
must fail, since under article III, the federal courts, in the absence
of diverse citizenship, can only have jurisdiction in cases "arising
under . . . the laws of the United States..... 26 That is to say,
to be constitutionally valid, the jurisdictional grant of section 301
must be founded on a body of substantive federal law created in
accordance with the legislative authority given to Congress by Article
I of the Constitution.2 7  The majority opinion concluded that such
a body of federal substantive law did in fact exist.28  Part of that
law is represented by express legislation enacted in pursuance of
the power of Congress to regulate commerce, and part has been left
by Congress to be developed by the "judicial inventiveness" of the
federal courts. 29
In a concurring opinion, Justices Burton and Harlan also
subscribed to the section's constitutionality, but on different grounds.
Though unwilling to go so far as to say that it contained any
federal substantive law, they were of the opinion that litigation under
the section might involve certain "federal rights" which could serve
as a basis for the exercise of "protective jurisdiction" by the federal
courts.30
22 National Labor Relations Act § 10(h), as amended, 61 Stat. 149 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 160(h) (1958).
23 W. L. Mead, Inc. v. Teamsters Union, 217 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1954).
24353 U.S. 448 (1957).
25348 U.S. 437, 449 (1955).
26 See Bunn, Lincoln Mills And The Jurisdiction To Enforce Collective Bar-
gaining Agreements, 43 VA. L. REv. 1247, 1257 (1957).
27 See Wellington, Judge M1agruder And The Labor Contract, 72 HARV.
L. REV. 1268, 1270 (1959).
28 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
29 Ibid.
30 Id. at 460. See Judge Magruder's opinion in International Bhd. of




In his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter took the
position that section 301 was devoid of substantive content. After
examining at length the section's legislative history, he concluded
that it had been intended merely as a means of providing access
to the federal courts in suits involving agreements between labor
organizations and employers, thereby rendering more expeditious
the enforcement of "state-created rights." -' It seemed to him that
the majority had gone too far in attributing to Congress an ex-
ercise of legislative discretion which was never contemplated and
had no basis in the scant provisions of section 301.32
With regard to the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Court decided
that it did not prevent the specific 'enforcement of arbitration
agreements.3 3 Although a literal reading of the "procedural require-
ments" of section 7 might not warrant such a conclusion, the
majority felt its decision was justified by the legislative history of
the act and the congressional policy in favor of settling labor
disputes.34
Since 1957 there has been considerable sentiment expressed in
support of the specific enforcement of no-strike clauses.3 5  The pro-
ponents of this view contend that it is not only possible, but in the
interest of public policy to "accommodate" the provisions of the
Taft-Hartley Act to those of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.3 6 This
basic approach has been utilized by the Supreme Court in enjoining
violations of the Railway Labor Act.3 7 It is also claimed that since
the no-strike clause is the quid pro quo in consideration of which
the employer consents to arbitrate grievance disputes, it follows
that granting specific performance of the latter provision would
seem to require the same remedy for violations of the former.3 8
Finally, an appeal has been made to the broad interpretation of section
301 adopted by the Supreme Court in Lincoln Mills, 39 which would
seem to warrant the specific enforcement of no-strike clauses as a
31 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra note 28, at 462, 475 (dissenting
opinion).
32 Id. at 464 (dissenting opinion).
331d. at 458-59.
34 Ibid.
35 See Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1482,
1485 (1959) ; Dannett, Picketing in Breach of a No-Strike Clause, 11 LAB.
L. J. 379, 383 (1960).
36 See Loeb, Accommodation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to Other
Federal Statutes, 11 LAB. L. J. 473, 482-83 (1960).
3 See, e.g., Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R.,
363 U.S. 528 (1960); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S.
768 (1952); Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 338 U.S. 232
(1949); Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n, 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
38 See Hoebreckx, Federal Courts Under Section 301, 43 MARQ. L. REv.
417, 434 (1960).
39 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).
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vehicle for strengthening the bargaining process and thereby achiev-
ing stable labor-management relations.
In 1957, A. H. Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union 40 re-
vived the issue of whether section 301 authorized injunctive relief
against strikes in violation of collective bargaining agreements. The
employer sought an injunction, and the district court held that
Lincoln Mills made the grant of injunctive relief possible.41 This
conclusion was reached despite what seemed to be the settled position
prior to 1957, that an employer's remedy in such circumstances was
limited to an action for damages. 42  On appeal, the district court's
holding was reversed. In adopting the view that the prohibition of
Norris-LaGuardia against the enjoining of peaceful strikes survived
the provisions of section 301, the court relied on substantially the
same reasons suggested in the Mead case.43 Furthermore, in its
view, Lincoln Mills did not control, since that case had only con-
cerned itself with the specific enforcement of arbitration agreements
and could not be construed as sanctioning the issuance of injunctions
against peaceful strikes.44  The Supreme Court refused to review
the case.45
The instant case reaches the same conclusion as that adopted
by the district court in the Bull case.46  It interprets the Supreme
Court's holding in Lincoln Mills as a sufficient basis for lifting the
ban against the issuance of injunctions by the federal courts in labor
disputes, i.e., where the action is one for breach of the no-strike
clause in a collective bargaining agreement.47 The Supreme Court
has granted certiorari,48 and the case thus presents an occasion for a
possible re-evaluation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
The purpose of this legislation was to promote the legitimate
ends of labor by preserving its basic weapon, the right to strike,
thereby assuring labor of a favorable position in the bargaining
process which was and remains the central factor in our system of
40 155 F. Supp. 739 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 250 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).41 A. H. Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 155 F. Supp. 739 (E.D.
N.Y. 1957).
42 See W. L. Mead, Inc. v. Teamsters Union, 217 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1954);
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. W. L. Mead, Inc, 230 F.2d 576 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 802 (1956).
43 See W. L. Mead, Inc. v. Teamsters Union, 217 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1954).
44 A. H. Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 250 F.2d 326, 331 (2d Cir.
1957).
45 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
46 Chauffeurs Local 795 v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, Inc., 282 F.2d
345 (10th Cir. 1960), cert. granted, 364 U.S. 931 (1961).
47 Ibid.




labor-management relations. 49 But where the right to strike is freely
surrendered in exchange for a workable apparatus of grievance
arbitration, it does not appear unreasonable to expect the concession
to be effective.50 Such a conclusion seems appropriate when one
considers the importance of maintaining the vitality of the collective
bargaining system. But the real problem is one of approach rather
than substance. The refusal of the courts to specifically enforce the
no-strike provisions of collective bargaining agreements has to a
great extent been couched in terms of reluctance to indulge in
"judicial legislation." r" It remains to be seen whether the Supreme
Court will adopt the same strict attitude.
49Norris-LaGuardia Act § 2, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1958).
This section reads in part: "[Ilt is necessary that [the individual worker]
. . . be free . . . in the designation of . . . representatives or in self-
organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining...
50 See Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARv. L. Ray. 1482,
1485 (1959).51 See, e.g., A. H. Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, supra note 44,
at 332.
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